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Abstract
This Note argues that the INS may obtain custody over aliens for habeas corpus purposes
by filing detainers with their respective prisons. Part I traces the history of habeas corpus and
the expanding meaning that U.S. courts have given the term “custody.” Part I also illustrates the
difficulty of defining a detainer for custodial purposes. Part II sets forth the approaches that courts
use to determine the custodial effects of INS detainers. Part III submits that courts should review
the intent behind the filing of an INS detainer to ascertain properly a detainer’s custodial effect.
This Note concludes that a court should base its interpretation of an INS detainer’s meaning on the
intent and understanding of the authorities that file and process the detainer.

CUSTODY BATTLE: THE FORCE OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE DETAINERS OVER
IMPRISONED ALIENS
INTRODUCTION
A writ of habeas corpus gives a person facing a restraint
on his liberty the right to an immediate hearing to determine
the restraint's legality.' This right originated in England2 and
has existed in the United States since the creation of the U.S.

judiciary.' Under current U.S. law, a person invoking4 the writ
must be "in custody" of a federal or state authority.

1. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968); 39 CJ.S. Habeas Corpus § 6 (1976).
Habeas corpus literally means "to have the body." Cohen, Some Considerations on the
Origins of Habeas Corpus, 16 CANADIAN B. REV. 92, 110 (1938).
2. See Peyton, 391 U.S. at 58; see also 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 108-25 (1926); Cohen, supra note 1, at 94; Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas
Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038 (1970) [hereinafter Developments].
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. The U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." Id.; see Developments, supra
note 2, at 1045.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988). This statute provides federal courts the general
power to grant writs of habeas corpus. Id. Specific provisions regarding the writ's
applicability in reviewing the legality of criminal convictions obtained in federal and
state courts appear in sections 2254 and 2255 of title 28 of the U.S. Code. Id.
§§ 2254-2255. Other statutes address additional evidentiary and procedural issues
surrounding the writ. See id. §§ 2242-2253. The habeas corpus statute concerning
the power to grant the writ states:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the [U.S.] Supreme Court,
any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the
records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained
of is had.
(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer
the application for hearing and determination to the district court having
jurisdiction to entertain it.
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless (1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act
of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or
judge of the United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States ....

Id. § 2241.
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A U.S. authority may obtain custody over a prisoner not in
its immediate physical control by filing a detainer with the prisoner's holding institution. 5 A detainer, defined as a restraint,6
may have one or two purposes. First, it may notify the institution of actions that the filing authority has taken, or may take,
concerning the prisoner.7 Second, it may direct an institution
to hold a prisoner for the filing authority.8
In recent years, several imprisoned aliens have sought
habeas corpus relief against the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the "INS") after the INS filed detainers with the
aliens' respective -prisons.9 These detainers either requested
that a prison notify the INS of an alien's pending release,'" or
ordered an alien to appear at a deportation hearing and notified the prison of that order." The aliens under the detainers
claimed that the detainers put them in INS custody and, therefore, entitled them to immediate deportation or exclusion

hearings. 12
5. See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484
(1973).
6. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 449 (6th ed. 1990) (defining detainer as "restraint
of a man's personal liberty against his will; detention").
7. See infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of and
components of detainers).
8. See, e.g., Braden, 410 U.S. at 498-99 (finding that Alabama warden's acting as
"agent" of Kentucky in holding petitioner established custody); Rose v. Morris, 619
F.2d 42, 44 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that detaining authority's intent to "retake" prisoner established custody); see infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (discussing
conflicting definitions of detainers).
9. See, e.g., Guti v. INS, 908 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1990); Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d
1028 (7th Cir. 1988); Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1082 (1989); Fernandez-Collado v. INS, 644 F. Supp. 741 (D. Conn. 1986),
aft'd, 857 F.2d 1461 (2d Cir. 1987).
10. INS Form 1-247 (Rev. 3-1-83) [hereinafter Standard INS Detainer]. The
standard INS detainer is reproduced as Appendix A to this Note. For a discussion of
specific components of the standard INS detainer, see infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
11. INS Form 1-221 (Rev. 7-1-73) [hereinafter Order to Show Cause]. The order to show cause is reproduced-as Appendix B to this Note.
12. See Guti, 908 F.2d at 495; Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1029-30; Campillo, 853 F.2d at
594; Fernandez-Collado, 644 F. Supp. at 742-43. Some aliens have challenged INS
detainers in habeas corpus by alleging that the filing of a detainer deprived them of
specific liberties. See Mohammed v. Sullivan, 866 F.2d 258, 259 (8th Cir. 1989) (alien
alleged that prison increased his security classification after INS filed detainer); Soler
v. INS, 749 F. Supp. 1011, 1012 (D. Ariz. 1990) (alien alleged that detainer affected
his confinement status). Other aliens have alleged that the mere existence of a detainer entitles aliens to relief. See Gonzalez v. INS, 867 F.2d 1108, 1109 (8th Cir.
1989) (alien sought writ of mandamus, not writ of habeas corpus, to challenge de-
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Recently, in Campilo v. Sullivan,"3 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected such a claim for habeas
corpus relief.' 4 Similarly, most federal courts have found that
an INS detainer over an alien does not constitute INS custody
over the alien."5 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
tainer's existence); Fernandez-Collado, 644 F. Supp. at 742 (alien alleged that filing of
detainer was sure to result in his detention by INS upon completion of his imprisonment).
The Code of Federal Regulations contains the INS's general and permanent
rules concerning the agency's apprehension, custody, and detention of aliens. 8
C.F.R. § 242.2 (1990). Section 242.2 states that "[dietainers may only be issued in
the case of an alien who is amenable to exclusion or deportation proceedings under
any provision of law." Id. § 242.2(a)(1); see infra notes 121 & 170 (discussing proposal to amend this rule to clarify INS intent in filing detainers).
An alien illegally entering or attempting to enter the United States for the first
time is typically subject to exclusion. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982);
Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1029. In contrast, an alien who has entered and "establish[ed]
the necessary presence" in the United States, but whose presence violates immigration laws, is typically subject to deportation. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S.
185, 187 (1958); Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1029; 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(13) (1988) (defining
"entry" of alien into United States); id. § 1251 (describing alien classes subject to
deportation).
Federal law identifies classes of aliens subject to exclusion or deportation. See id.
§ 1182 (describing classes of aliens subject to exclusion); id. § 1251 (describing
classes subject to deportation). Although the standard INS detainer refers to deportation, one court recognized its utility as a detainer in the exclusion context. Vargas,
854 F.2d at 1028-34; see Standard INS Detainer, supra note 10. Accordingly, the distinctions between excludable aliens and deportable aliens are generally not relevant
in this context. See Prieto v. Gluch, 913 F.2d 1159, 1163 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 976 (1991); see also Landon, 459 U.S. at 25-27 (discussing differences between excludable aliens and deportable aliens); Note, Habeas Corpus and Immigration:
Important Issues and Developments, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 503, 503-08 (1990) (discussing
differences between excludable aliens and deportable aliens). Prieto concluded that
the reasoning in Vargas, which coicerned a potentially excludable alien, was "inconsistent" with the reasoning in Campillo v. Sullivan, which concerned a potentially deportable alien. Prieto, 913 F.2d at 1163. But see Campillo, 853 F.2d at 595.
13. 853 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 (1989).
14. Id. at 595.
15. See Prieto, 913 F.2d 1159; Orozco v. INS, 911 F.2d 539 (11 th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam); Gonzalez v. INS, 867 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1989); Mohammed v. Sullivan, 866
F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1989); Ganem v. INS, 825 F.2d 410, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 10499
(6th Cir. Aug. 5, 1987); Roberts v. Matthews, No. 88-3014-0, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16494 (D. Kan. Nov. 30, 1990); Soler v. INS, 749 F. Supp. 1011 (D. Ariz. 1990);
Garcia v. INS, 733 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D. Pa. 1990); Ganem v. Gluch, No. 88-CV71258-DT, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4638 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 1989); Cabezas v. Scott,
717 F. Supp. 696 (D. Ariz. 1989); D'Ambrosio v. INS, 710 F. Supp. 269 (N.D. Cal.
1989); Pita v. INS, No. 88-2267, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10667 (E.D. La. Sept. 14,
1988); Fernandez-Collado v. INS, 644 F. Supp: 741 (D. Conn. 1986), aff'd, 857 F.2d
1461 (2d Cir. 1987); Martinez v. INS, No. 85-C-9674 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 1986) (LEXIS
Immig library, Courts file).
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Circuit, however, suggested a different approach in Vargas v.
Swan.1 6 The Vargas court held that an INS detainer that effects
the "holding" of a prisoner for a deportation or exclusion
hearing or investigation could constitute INS custody over the
7
prisoner for habeas corpus purposes.
This Note argues that the INS may obtain custody over
aliens for habeas corpus purposes by filing detainers with their
respective prisons. Part I traces the history of habeas corpus
and the expanding meaning that U.S. courts have given the
term "custody." Part I also illustrates the difficulty of defining
a detainer for custodial purposes. Part II sets forth the approaches that courts use to determine the custodial effects of
INS detainers. Part III submits that courts should review the
intent behind the filing of an INS detainer to ascertain properly a detainer's custodial effect. This Note concludes that a
court should base its interpretation of an INS detainer's meaning on the intent and understanding of the authorities that file
and process the detainer.
I. HABEAS CORPUS, THE SCOPE OF CUSTODY,
AND DETAINERS
The mere filing of an INS detainer does not necessarily
provide an imprisoned alien with a right to challenge the detainer in a habeas corpus proceeding.' 8 To exercise this right,
an alien must demonstrate that the detainer creates INS custody.' 9 The development of the habeas corpus doctrine and
the expansion of the meaning of the concept of "custody,"
however, leave the reach of a detainer undefined,20 and an
16. 854 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1988).
17. Id. at 1032; see Guti v. INS, 908 F.2d 495, 496 (9th Cir. 1990) (restating
Vargas holding). The Vargas holding applied to any "future custodian who has evidenced an intent to retake or to decide the prisoner's future status at the end of his
or her current confinement." Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1032.
18. See Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that
filing of standard INS detainer alone does not justify availability of habeas corpus
relief), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 (1989). But see Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1032-34 (suggesting that alien's habeas corpus action may lie).
19. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (noting cases that addressed
aliens' habeas corpus claims).
20. See infra notes 22-103 and accompanying text (discussing habeas corpus, custody, and detainers).
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alien's right to challenge an INS detainer unclear. 2 '
A. Habeas Corpus in English and U.S. Legal History
Historians are uncertain about the origin of the writ of
habeas corpus. 22 The words "habeat corpora," however, appear in a 1220 order that directed an English sheriff to produce parties to a trespass action. 23 Early English courts used
habeas corpus to procure the appearance of unwilling parties
in court.24
By the end of the sixteenth century, courts employed
many forms of habeas corpus.2 5 One form, habeas corpus ad subficiendum, the writ used in criminal confinement cases, 26 be21. See supra note 18 (discussing cases that conflict on alien's right to challenge
INS detainer).
22. See 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 104-12; see also Developments, supra
note 2, at 1042.
23. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1042.
24. See R.P. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPus 4-5 (1969); Developments, supra note

2, at 1042. Until the sixteenth century, English courts used the writ to expand their
jurisdictions at the expense of rival courts. See 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at
109. In medieval England, local and franchise courts waged battle over their respective jurisdictions. See id. By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the battle extended
to such rival central courts as the Admiralty, the Chancery, and the Council and Star
Chamber. Id.; see Developments, supra note 2, at 1042.
25. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1043. William Blackstone identified five
common law forms of habeas corpus writs. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 12932. The first is habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which directed a person detaining another to produce the body of the prisoner. Id. at * 131; see infra notes 26-28 and
accompanying text (discussing this habeas writ). The second form of the writ is ad
respondendum, which effected the removal of a prisoner from one court to another. 3
W. BLACKSTONE, supra, at * 129. The third form of the writ is ad satisfaciendum, which
effected the bringing of a prisoner who has had judgment against him to a higher
court, so that the plaintiff could charge him with process of execution. Id. at * 129-30.
The fourth form of the writ is adprosquendum, testificandum, deliberandum, which effected
the removal of a prisoner "in order to prosecute or bear testimony in any court, or to
be tried in the proper jurisdiction wherein the act was committed." Id. at * 130. The
final common law form of the writ is adfaciendum et recipiendum, which effected the
removal of a case and a prisoner to a superior court that had jurisdiction. Id.
Courts still use some of these writs today. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1043
n.8. Federal judges may issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum to bring a prisoner
into court to testify or for trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1988) (stating that writ
shall extend to prisoner if "[i]t is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for
trial"); see also Developments, supra note 2, at 1043 n.8. The U.S. Supreme Court has
also upheld the use of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosquendum to deliver a New York
prisoner to California for trial. Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 612-13 (1961).
26. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1043.
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came the most important of the writs. 7 The term "habeas
28
corpus," standing alone, generally refers to this writ.
Initially, the habeas corpus writ proved ineffective against
the Crown's power. 2 9 During much of the seventeenth century, Parliament and the Crown battled over the Crown's
abuses of its power to arrest, leaving the status of the writ uncertain. 30 Finally, in 1679, Parliament adopted the forerunner
of all habeas corpus acts, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 (the
"1679 Act"). 3 ' This act strengthened the power of common
law courts to grant habeas corpus relief to prisoners seeking
review of'their confinements.3 2 The 1679 Act, however, specifically excluded from its coverage convicted criminals who
33
sought to challenge their confinements.
England never extended the 1679 Act to its American col27. See id. (noting that "[bly the close of the sixteenth century there were many
forms of habeas corpus of which the most important was habeas corpus ad subjiciendum").
28. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.); Developments, supra note 2, at 1043 n.9. The habeas corpus writ is "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift
and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement." Secretary of
State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, [1923] App. Cas. 603, 609 (H.L.); see Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (quoting O'Brien).
29. See Darnel's Case, 3 Cobbett's St. Tr. 1 (1627) (available in Library, Columbia
University School of Law, Treasure Room); see also Developments, supra note 2, at 1043.
Darnel's Case was perhaps the most celebrated early habeas corpus case. See R.P. SoKOL, supra note 24, at 9; Developments, supra note 2, at 1043 n. 11. King Charles I, hardpressed financially, sought to compel his subjects to lend him money. See R.P. SOKOL,

supra note 24, at 9. The King imprisoned Darnel and four other knights for refusing
to make loans to him. See id. Rejecting the knights' claims for habeas corpus relief,
the King's Bench concluded that habeas corpus was a state matter, beyond the
court's authority. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1043 n. 11.
30. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1044.
31. 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 (1679) [hereinafter 1679 Act]; see Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. 236, 239 (1963); Developments, supra note 2, at 1044.
32. 1679 Act, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2; see Developments, supra note 2, at 1045. The 1679
Act

made the writ of Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum the most effective weapon yet
devised for the protection of the liberty of the subject, by providing both for
a speedy judicial inquiry into the justice of any imprisonment on a criminal
charge, and for a speedy trial of prisoners remanded to await trial.
9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 118.
33. 1679 Act, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2, § 3; see 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 118;
Developments, supra note 2, at 1045. Convicted criminals had to resort to habeas
corpus at the common law. Id. For a discussion of the 1679 Act's major strengths
and weaknesses, see 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 117-21.
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onies.34 When the first U.S. Congress passed the Judiciary Act
of 1789, 35 however, it empowered federal courts to issue writs
of habeas corpus to prisoners in federal custody. 36 A court
considering a habeas corpus claim, however, could inquire into
only a prisoner's "cause of commitment," not the nature of a
prisoner's custody.37 The Judiciary Act of 1789 used custody
solely to limit a federal court's jurisdiction to prisoners in federal cus.tody, rather than state custody. 8 Consistent with this
view, the common law continued to limit the purposes for
which a prisoner could invoke the writ.39 A prisoner could invoke federal habeas corpus only to challenge insufficient legal
process in nonjudicial detentions, or to challenge the jurisdiction of a court to confine.40
These
limitations, however, diminished after the Civil
4
War. ' Changes in federal-state relations in the Reconstruc-

tion era helped spur new interest in protecting individual liberty against state power, resulting in a more expansive role for
the federal judiciary in inquiring into federal and state detentions.42 In 1867, Congress passed a habeas corpus bill (the
"1867 Act") 4 3 in part to enlarge the scope of habeas corpus
34. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1045.
35. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 [hereinafter Judiciary
Act of 1789].
36. Id. TheJudiciary Act of 1789 stated:
That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power
to issue writs of scirefacias, habeas corpus .... and all other writs not specially
provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.
And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the
district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. Provided, that writs of
habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they
are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or
are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be
brought into court to testify.
Id.
37. Id.; see Brief for Respondents at 36, Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (No.
802) [hereinafter Peyton Brief].
38. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82; see Peyton Brief, supra
note 37, at 36.
39. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.).
40. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201 (1830).
41. See Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1027 (1985).
42. See id.
43. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 [hereinafter 1867 Act]. The act
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and to extend federal courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas
corpus petitions.4 4 The 1867 Act permitted federal courts to
entertain state prisoners' habeas corpus petitions.45 Moreover,
it changed the subject of a court's inquiry from "cause of commitment" to construction of the phrase "restrained of [one's]
liberty."'4 6 Consequently, courts began to identify the degrees
47
of restraint necessary to constitute "custody.
B. The Scope of Custody
U.S. habeas corpus statutes have never defined custody,
the key measure of restraint. 48 As a result, for many years federal courts turned to U.S. and English common law to deteramended the Judiciary Act of 1789. See id.; supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text
(discussing Judiciary Act of 1789).
44. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-18 (1963). Congress passed the 1867 Act "to
enlarge the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and make the jurisdiction of the
courts and judges of the United States coextensive with all the powers that can be
conferred upon them. It is a bill of the largest liberty." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4151 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence); see Fay, 372 U.S. at 417 (quoting
Rep. Lawrence). The 1867 Act states that
the several courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges of
such courts, within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority
already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in
all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation
of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.... Said writ
shall be directed to the person in whose custody the party is detained, who
shall make return of said writ and bring the party before the judge who
granted the writ, and certify the true cause of the detention of such person
1867 Act, ch, 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; see infra note 75 (discussing meaning of "within
their respective jurisdictions").
45. 1867 Act, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; see Developments, supra note 2, at 1048.
46. 1867 Act, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; see Peyton Brief, supra note 37, at 37.
47. Fay, 372 U.S. at 415; see Developments, supra note 2, at 1048 n.48. "[C]ustody
in the sense of restraint of liberty is a prerequisite to habeas... " Fay, 372 U.S. at
427 n.38.
The 1867 Act survives, except for some changes in wording, in the current
habeas corpus statute. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 415. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988) with
1867-Act, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
48. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963); McNally v. Hill, 293
U.S. 131, 136 (1934); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571 (1885); see also Developments, supra note 2, at 1072. The Wales Court proposed a reason for the absence of a
statutory definition of custody. Wales, 114 U.S. at 571. The Court noted that the
framing of a definition "can hardly be expected from the variety of restraints for
which it is used to give relief." Id. This observation would prove quite prescient. See
infra notes 54-84 (discussing expansion of scope of custody).
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mine the meaning of custody.4 9 For nearly one hundred years
after passage of the 1867 Act, most U.S. courts considered custody to involve "physical restraint. ' 5° In Wales v. Whitney, 5 ' the
U.S. Supreme Court required "actual confinement" as opposed to mere "moral restraint."52 Thereafter, U.S. courts
used the same narrow concept of custody to reject habeas
corpus challenges to criminal convictions in a variety of circumstances.53
In 1950, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania became the first U.S. court to make an exception
49. See McNally, 293 U.S. at 136; see also Jones, 371 U.S. at 238.
50. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1073 n.6 (noting that in all cases testing
criminal convictions in habeas corpus, petitioners had to demonstrate physical custody). More recently, however, the Supreme Court suggested that "something less
than close physical confinement" had been necessary for the writ to be a proper remedy. Jones, 371 U.S. at 238. The Jones Court relied on English cases that found
habeas corpus remedies in child custody cases, and U.S. cases that found habeas
corpus remedies available to aliens seeking entry into the United States. Id. at 23840. The petitioners in these cases faced no imprisonment, but each petitioner faced a
restraint in movement sufficient to warrant habeas corpus relief. Id.
51. 114 U.S. 564 (1885).
52. Id. at 571-72. The opinion in Wales, however, suggested that something less
than close physical confinement might suffice for custody. Id. at 571. The Court
stated that
[w]ives restrained by husbands, children withheld from the proper parent or
guardian, persons held under arbitrary custody by private individuals, as in
a madhouse, as well as those under military control, may all become proper
subjects of relief by the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, the extent and character of the restraint which justifies the writ must vary according to the nature of the control which is asserted over the party in whose behalf the writ
is prayed.
Id.
Dictum in Wales suggested that the Supreme Court intended availability of
habeas corpus relief even in these limited circumstances. See id. at 572. In the case at
bar, Mr. Whitney, the Secretary of the Navy, ordered Dr. Wales, a former Navy medical director, to remain in Washington, D.C. pending the outcome of Dr. Wales's
court-martial. Id. at 566-68. In denying Dr. Wales's request for habeas corpus relief,
the Court implied that restraint required more than a legal order. Id. at 572. The
court stated that "[i]f Dr. Wales had chosen to disobey this order, he had nothing to
do but take the next or subsequent train from the city and leave it. There was no one
at hand to hinder him." Id.
53. See Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339 (1920) (denying relief to petitioner released on bail); Viles v. United States, 193 F.2d 776 (10th Cir.) (per curiam) (concerning petitioner on probation who alleged no facts entitling him to habeas corpus
relief), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915 (1952); see also Weber v. Squier, 315 U.S. 810 (1942)
(denying certiorari as moot) (denying relief to paroled prisoner); Developments, supra
note 2, at 1074.
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to this rigid notion of custody.5 4 The court considered the
habeas corpus petition of a prisoner, subject to a deportation
order, who faced an INS detainer.55 The detainer required the
prisoner's institution to deliver the prisoner to the INS upon
completion of his sentence. 56 The district court concluded
that the prisoner could seek habeas corpus relief from the deportation order after it concluded that the prisoner was in the
"technical custody" of the INS. 5 7 Twelve years later, on similar facts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
granted a prisoner habeas corpus relief after finding that the
58
INS had "technical custody" over him.
The following year, in Jones v. Cunningham, 9 the Supreme
Court began its break from the traditional "physical restraint"

requirement for custody.6 0 Mr. Jones brought a habeas corpus

petition to challenge his ten-year prison sentence. 6 ' The U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Mr.
Jones's petition, but the Virginia Parole Board paroled Mr.
Jones pending his appeal.6 2 The parole order placed Mr.
54. Slavik v. Miller, 89 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 184 F.2d 575 (3d Cir.
1950) (per curiam), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 955 (1951).
55. Id.; see infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of
and components of INS detainers).
56. Slavik, 89 F. Supp. at 576.
57. Id. The court concluded that the INS did not have "actual custody" over the
petitioner. Id. The court decided, however, that actual custody was not required for
habeas corpus purposes. Id. The court, nevertheless, dismissed Slavik's petition on
procedural grounds. Id. Mr. Slavik did not seek relief under a habeas corpus statute,
but under the Administrative Procedure Act, which enlarged the rights to judicial
review of aliens under deportation orders. Slavik, 89 F. Supp. at 576-77; see 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1011 (1946) (current version at scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (1988)). The
petitioner named only the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization as a defendant. Slavik, 89 F. Supp. at 576. The petitioner could not make personal service
on the Commissioner in the Western District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 576-77. As a
result, the district court found that it lacked jurisdiction, and dismissed the claim
without prejudice. Id. at 577.
58. Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, 309 F.2d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 1962). The Ninth
Circuit held that when "a warrant [for a prisoner's deportation] is obtained by the
[INS] while the person named is in a penal institution, and on the basis thereof a
detainer is lodged with that institution, the Service gains immediate technical custody." Id. Although the INS moved to reopen Chew's deportation hearings eleven
days prior to Chew's release from prison, this motion did not affect the prisoner's
status under the warrant. Id. at 860, 865.
59. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
60. See id.; see also Developments, supra note 2, at 1074.
61. Jones, 371 U.S. at 237.
62. Id.
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Jones in the parole board's "custody and control. '6 3 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed Mr. Jones's
appeal as moot. 64 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding
that although Mr. Jones no longer faced "immediate physical
confinement," the parole conditions significantly restricted his
freedom. 6 5 Furthermore, the Court suggested that the existence of restraints that the public does not generally share
might constitute custody.6 6
Five years later, in 1968, the Supreme Court extended the
meaning of custody in Peyton v. Rowe. 67 Mr. Rowe, serving a
thirty-year sentence in a Virginia state prison, sought to attack
via federal habeas corpus a twenty-year sentence to run consecutively to the thirty-year sentence. 6 8 The Supreme Court
concluded that a prisoner serving a sentence could attack, in
habeas corpus, a future consecutive sentence at the same insti63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 237-38, 243 & 244. Justice Black explained some of these conditions:
Petitioner is confined by the parole order to a particular community, house,
and job at the sufferance of his parole officer. He cannot drive a car without
permission. He must periodically report to his parole officer, permit the
officer to visit his home and job at any time, and follow the officer's advice .... It is not relevant that conditions and restrictions such as these may
be desirable and important parts of the rehabilitative process; what matters
is that they significantly restrain petitioner's liberty to do those things which
in this country free men are entitled to do.
Id. at 242-43.
66. Id. at 240. The Court concluded that "there are other restraints on a man's
liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus." Id.
This language could potentially cover such restraints as are imposed by contracts,
denials of licenses, and injunctions, but such a wide application "would be at odds
with any reasonable purpose of the terms 'custody' and 'prisoner' repeatedly used in
[28 U.S.C. § 2241)." Developments, supra note 2, at 1076-77; see 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(1988); supra note 4 (quoting section 2241).
67. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
68. Id. at 55-56. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia
denied the petitioner relief. Id. at 56. In rejecting Mr. Rowe's claim, the Court relied
on McNally v. Hill, a Supreme Court decision that held that a prisoner may not attack
a future consecutive sentence in habeas corpus because such an attack was premature. Id.; see McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 138 (1934). Courts and commentators
refer to McNally's conclusions as the "prematurity doctrine." See, e.g., Peyton, 391
U.S. at 65; Developments, supra note 2, at 1087.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court decision, and announced that it would not follow McNally. Rowe v. Peyton, 383
F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
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tution.6 9 The Court found that the prisoner was in custody
pursuant to a sentence that he had not yet begun to serve.70
In 1973, a trio of Supreme Court decisions further expanded the scope of custody. 7' The first, Braden v. 30thJudicial
Circuit Court of Kentucky, 72 concerned a prisoner jailed in Alabama who raised a habeas corpus challenge in a Kentucky
court to an indictment that Kentucky lodged against him.73
Concluding that the petitioner was "in custody" for the purposes of the habeas corpus statute,7 the Court held that a prisoner in one state could attack in habeas corpus an out-of-state
69. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 67. The Peyton Court overruled McNally v. Hill. Peyton,
391 U.S. at 67; see supra note 68 (discussing McNally). The Court concluded that "in
common understanding," the Virginia State Penitentiary had custody over Mr. Rowe
for Mr. Rowe's entire imprisonment. Id. at 64. Peyton discarded McNally's notion that
a prisoner could not attack a confinement which, even if resolved in the prisoner's
favor, could not have resulted in the prisoner's immediate release. Id. at 67; see McNally, 293 U.S. at 137-38.
70. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 67.
71. See infra notes 72-84 and accompanying text (discussing three Supreme
Court decisions).
On the day it decided Peyton, the Supreme Court decided another notable case
concerning habeas corpus. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). Carafasheld
that a state prisoner could challenge a conviction in habeas corpus even if the prisoner's sentence for the conviction had expired while the petition was pending. Id. at
239. This decision overruled Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960) (per curiam).
Carafas, 391 U.S. at 240. The Carafas Court concluded that
[i]n consequence of his conviction, [Mr. Carafas] cannot engage in certain
businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union for a specified
period of time; he cannot vote in any election held in New York State; he
cannot serve as a juror. Because of these "disabilities or burdens [which]
may flow from" petitioner's conviction, he has "a substantial stake in the
judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him."
Id. at 237 (footnotes omitted).
A year later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided Word v.
North Carolina, the first post-Peyton case to decide the custodial effect of consecutive
sentences in different jurisdictions. See Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4th
Cir. 1969). Virginia and North Carolina courts had convicted and sentenced Mr.
Word separately. Id. at 353. While Mr. Word was serving the Virginia sentence,
North Carolina filed a detainer with Virginia authorities. Id. Mr. Word challenged
the detainer in habeas corpus. Id. The court ruled in Mr. Word's favor, finding that
Virginia's authority to detain Mr. Word was "dual." Id. at 355. Further, the court
said that unlike the consecutive sentences in Peyton, "the successive sentences sought
to be attacked were imposed by another sovereign, but the difference is not one of
legal or practical significance." Id.
72. 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
73. Id. at 485.
74. Id. at 489 n.4; see 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988); supra note 4 (quoting section
2241).
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indictment, and could demand an immediate trial or dismissal
of the indictment. 75 The Court found that the demanding,
state, Kentucky, had custody over Braden, and that Alabama
acted as Kentucky's "agent" in holding Braden.7 6
In the second case, Hensley v. Municipal Court, San JoseMilpitasJudicial District,7 7 the Supreme Court upheld the right
of a petitioner to challenge his conviction in habeas corpus
even after he won release on his own recognizance.78 The
Court relied on many lower federal court opinions that found
petitioners released on their own recognizance to be "in cus75. Braden, 410 U.S. at 500-01. The issue in Braden was whether the provision of
the habeas corpus statute that "[w~rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the...
district courts .. .within their respective jurisdictions" prevented a Kentucky court
from hearing the petitioner's application on the Kentucky indictment. Id. at 485-86;
see 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988); supra note 4 (quoting section 2241). In sustaining the
Alabama court's jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reviewed Ahrens v. Clark, which limited a district court's habeas corpus jurisdiction to cases in which the prisoner is confined within the court's territorial jurisdiction. Braden, 410 U.S. at 494-500; see
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948). Ahrens relied primarily on what it saw as congressional intent in framing habeas corpus statutes. Id. at 191-92. The debate preceding passage of the 1867 Act does not clearly indicate that Congress wanted the
phrase "within their respective jurisdictions" to apply to the location of the prisoner.
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4150-51; 1867 Act, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385;
supra note 44 (quoting 1867 Act); see also Brief for Petitioner at 11, Braden v. 30th
Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (No. 71-6516) [hereinafter
Braden Brief]. Instead, Congress may have intended the phrase to apply to "the location of the custodian and the reach of the court's process to the respondent." See id.
at 12.
The Senator who had offered to insert "within their respective jurisdictions" in
the 1867 Act thought the language redundant. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d
Sess. 790 (statement of Sen. Trumbull). Before the amended bill passed, one senator
who favored the amendment worried aloud over judges who, otherwise, would "have
a right to issue process ...

all over the Union." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.

790 (1867) (statement of Sen. Johnson). The Senate sent the amended bill to the
House of Representatives. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 899; Braden Brief,
supra, at 14. The bill passed with one comment: "I would ask whether anybody in this
House, when he gives his vote on these amendments, knows what he is voting upon?
[Laughter.]" CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 899 (1867) (statement of Rep.
Wright).
Prior to Braden, congressional action and court decisions had challenged Ahrens's
vitality. See Braden, 410 U.S. at 497-99. The Braden Court professed only to limit
sharply the Ahrens rule. Id. at 500. The decision, however, effectively overruled
Ahrens. See id. at 502 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
76. Braden, 410 U.S. at 498-99 (holding that "[sitate holding the prisoner in immediate confinement acts as agent for the demanding State"); see infra note 156 (discussing syllogistic nature of Braden's agency test).
77. 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
78. Id. at 345-47.
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tody" pursuant to their convictions. 70 Although the restraints
on Hensley were less restrictive than those imposed on the petitioner in Jones, they still sufficed to create custody. 80
Finally, in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 8 1 the Supreme Court concluded that a prisoner could challenge in habeas corpus the
deprivation of good-behavior time credit toward reduction of
the prisoner's maximum sentence.8 2 The Court found that a
writ of habeas corpus served as a prisoner's sole federal remedy in a challenge to the fact or duration of a physical imprisonment.83 Furthermore, the Court recognized the availability
of habeas corpus to attack future confinement.8 4
The expansion of the scope of custody has made the remedy of federal habeas corpus available to many classes of peti79. Id. at 349 n.6; see Capler v. City of Greenville, 422 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir.
1970); Marden v. Purdy, 409 F.2d 784, 785 (5th Cir. 1969); Beck v. winters, 407 F.2d
125, 126-27 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969); Burris v. Ryan, 397 F.2d 553,
555 (7th Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Smith v. DiBella, 314 F. Supp. 446 (D.
Conn. 1970); Ouletta v. Sarver, 307 F. Supp. 1099, 1i01 n.l (E.D. Ark.), aft'd, 428
F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1970); Cantillon v. Superior Court, 305 F. Supp. 304, 306-07 (C.D.
Cal. 1969); Matzner v. Davenport, 288 F. Supp. 636, 638 n. 1 (D.NJ. 1968), aff'd sub
nom. Matzner v. Brown, 410 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1015
(1970); Nash v. Purdy, 283 F. Supp. 837, 838-39 (S.D. Fla. 1968); Duncombe v. New
York, 267 F. Supp. 103, 109 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Foster v. Gilbert, 264 F. Supp. 209,
211-12 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
80. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 348-49. Pursuant to the California Penal Code, the petitioner in Hensley was subject to restraints "not shared by the public generally." Id. at
351. The Hensley Court stated that the petitioner could not "come and go as he
pleases. His freedom of movement rests in the hands of state judicial officers, who
may demand his presence at any time and without a-moment's notice. Disobedience
is itself a criminal offense." Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351. Furthermore, as in Peyton, the
petitioner's incarceration was not "a speculative possibility that depends *on a
number of contingencies over which he has no control." Id. at 351-52; see Peyton v.
Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 64 (1968).
81. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
82. Id. at 487-88.
83. Id. at 489. In Preiser, the Court denied the prisoner relief. Id. at 500. The
prisoner had challenged the deprivation of his credits under the Civil Rights Act of
1871 and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, Id. at 476 & 478; see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1988). The Court concluded that a writ of habeas corpus was the prisoner's
only possible federal remedy. Preiser,411 U.S. at 500. The prisoner in Preiser, however, could not seek a writ of habeas corpus because he had not exhausted state
judicial remedies before proceeding in federal court. Id. at 489-97 & 500 (discussing
importance of exhausting state judicial remedies and prisoner's failure to do so); see
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988) (requiring that person in state custody exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus relief).
84. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487 (noting that "recent cases have established that
habeas corpus relief is not limited to immediate release from illegal custody, but that
the writ is available to attack future confinement and obtain future releases").
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tioners, 5 including prisoners who face detainers.8 6 This development, however, has not resolved the question of whether
a detainer necessarily effects custody. 7
C. Detainers

The absence of a statutory definition, and scant case law,
make defining an INS detainer and its custodial effect difficult.8 8 Moreover, attempts to define detainers in other contexts invite confusion. 9 A few courts have found that the filing
of a detainer, without a warrant, gives the filing authority custody over a prisoner if the detainer contains an implied "hold
order."9 ° Some commentators, however, suggest that a detainer constitutes a "hold order" and a "warrant," but grants
no legal authority to detain. 9 ' In contrast, the House and Senate Reports for the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act explain that a criminal detainer serves only as a "notification" to
85. See supra notes 54-84 and accompanying text (discussing expansion of scope
of custody).
86. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973);
Chung Young Chew v. Boyd. 309 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1962); Slavik v. Miller, 89 F.
Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 184 F. 2d 575 (3d. Cir. 1950) (per curiam), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 955 (1951).
87. Compare Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1988) with Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 (1989).
88. See Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1031 (discussing difficulty of defining detainer in immigration context).
89. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting definitions of detainers).
90. See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484,
498-99 (1973) (holding that Alabama warden acted as "agent" of Kentucky in holding petitioner and thus had custody over petitioner). In Rose v. Morris, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that "a detainer in the form of a communication from the Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles requesting that it
be notified before Rose was to be released from federal custody so that it could retake
Rose and require him to begin serving the balance of his sentences . . .is sufficient
'custody' " for habeas purposes. Rose v. Morris, 619 F.2d 42, 44 (9th Cir. 1980)
(emphasis added). Furthermore, in Orito v. Powers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit found that a state request for notification of a prisoner's pending
release from federal prison, so that the state could determine the prisoner's future
status, constituted a "hold" because federal authorities interpreted the request as a
hold. Orito v. Powers, 479 F.2d 435, 437 (7th Cir. 1973).
91. See Note, Unconstitutional Uncertainty:A Study of the Use of Detainers, I U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 119 (1968); Note, Interstate Detainers and Federal Habeas Corpus: Long-Arm
Shortcut to Solving the Catch 2241, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 863, 865. One student commen-

tator has concluded that "[a] detainer, or 'hold order,' is a warrant filed against a
person already in custody to ensure that he will be available to the demanding authority upon completion of the present term of confinement." See id.

756 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:741
a prisoner's institution that the prisoner faces criminal charges
in another jurisdiction.9 2 A fourth definition, from the
Supreme Court, suggests that a detainer may constitute either
a hold or a notification.9 3 The definition of a detainer thus remains unclear.
The standard INS detainer has four major components.9 4
92. H.R. REP. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); S. REP. No. 1356, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 4864,
4865. The House and Senate Reports define a detainer as "a notification filed with
the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to
face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction." H.R. REP. No. 1018, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); S. REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4864, 4865. The Interstate Agreement on
Detainers Act does not define "detainer." See United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340,
359 (1978).
93. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985). The Supreme Court defined a detainer as "a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in
which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for
the agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent." Id.
The utility of this definition in the immigration context is unclear because a deportation proceeding is a "purely civil action" and does not concern "criminal justice."
See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). The Supreme Court did not
decide whether an exclusion proceeding was also a civil action. See id. at 1038-39.
The Supreme Court announced another definition of a detainer in Moody v.
Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976). The Court stated that
[a] detainer in this context is an internal administrative mechanism to assure
that an inmate subject to an unexpired term of confinement will not be released from custody until the jurisdiction asserting a parole violation has
had an opportunity to act-in this case by taking the inmate into custody or
by making a parole revocation determination.
Id. at 80-81 n.2. The court defined a detainer in the context of a parole violator
warrant. Id. This definition's effect in the immigration context is therefore unclear.
See id. In Campillo v. Sullivan, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit relied
on the Moody Court's definition in an immigration case. Campillo v. Sullivan, 853
F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 (1989).
94. See Standard INS Detainer, supra note 10. The detainer form requires the
INS to check off blank boxes to indicate the nature of the action that the form represents. Id. The actual content of the standard INS detainer thus depends on which
boxes the INS checks off. See id.; see also Payo v. Hayes, 754 F. Supp. 164, 166 (N.D.
Cal. 1991). This Note assumes that the INS checks off the boxes that purportedly
describe a detainer's content when it files a standard INS detainer with an alien's
prison. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (describing detainer's components). In contrast to the standard INS detainer, the order to show cause, also at
issue in these cases, has no optional boxes for the INS to check off. See Order to
Show Cause, supra note 11.
Some courts have described the contents of the detainers that they were considering. See Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1988); Campillo v. Sullivan,
853 F.2d 593, 594 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 (1989); FernandezCollado v. INS, 644 F. Supp. 741, 742 (D. Conn. 1986), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1461 (2d Cir.
1987). Other courts have failed to describe the contents of the detainers that they
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First, the INS identifies the document as a detainer. 9 5 Second,
the INS may request in the detainer that the recipient accept
the detainer "for notification purposes only."' 96 Third, the INS
may request that the recipient notify the INS of the prisoner's
scheduled release date at least thirty days prior to that date.9 7
Finally, the INS may notify the recipient of actions that the INS
has taken concerning the prisoner. 98 One of these actions, an
order of deportation, may give the INS custody over the prisoner. 99 Courts have not decided whether another of these actions, issuance of a warrant of arrest in a deportation proceedwere considering, and ruled on the custodial effect of INS detainers generally. See
Mohammed v. Sullivan, 866 F.2d 258, 260 (8th Cir. 1989); Roberts v. Matthews, No.
88-3014-0, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494, at 2 (D. Kan. Nov. 30, 1990); Garcia v.INS, 733 F. Supp. 1554, 1555 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
In exclusion cases, the form analogous to the order to show cause is the "Notice
to Applicant for Admission Detained for Hearing before Immigration Judge." INS
Form 1-122 (Rev. 5-4-79) [hereinafter 1-122 Form]; see 8 C.F.R. § 299.1 (1990) (listing immigration forms); Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 5 n.6, Vargas v. Swan,
854 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1988) (No 87-1769) [hereinafter Vargas Brief for Appellee].
The 1-122 Form notifies an alien that an immigration judge has scheduled or will
schedule a hearing to determine the alien's excludability. See Hernandez v. Cremer,
913 F.2d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1990). The INS may "detain" certain potentially excludable aliens pursuant to the filing of an 1-122 form. See Gallego v. INS, 663 F. Supp.
517, 519 & 524 (W.D. Wis. 1987). According to federal statute, an alien "who may
not appear to the examining immigration officer at the port of arrival to be clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for further inquiry." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b) (1988). Discussion of the issues arising in connection with the 1-122 form
is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of a potentially excludable alien's
ability to challenge in habeas corpus an order to show cause, see infra note 172.
95. See Standard INS Detainer, supra note 10.
96. See id. The INS may advise in the detainer, "It is requested that you accept
this notice as a detainer. This is for notification purposes only and does not limit
your discretion in any decision affecting the offender's classification, work and
quarters assignments or other treatment which he would otherwise receive." Id.; see
infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text (discussing how some institutions receiving detainers interpreted this advisory).
The order to show cause also is defined as a "notice." Order to Show Cause,
supra note 11.

97. See Standard INS Detainer, supra note 10.
98. See id. The INS does not explicitly identify either the standard INS detainer
or the order to show cause as a "hold." See id.; Order to Show Cause, supra note 11.
99. See Flores v. INS, 524 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). The deportation order in Flores would have gone into force automatically after expiration of
a period when the petitioners could have voluntarily departed the United States. Id.
The court concluded that this circumstance created "sufficient immediacy of action
and interference with freedom to support habeas corpus jurisdiction." Id.; see 8
U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(9) (1988) (stating that "any alien held in custody pursuant to an
order of deportation may obtain judicial review thereof by habeas corpus proceedings").
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ing, creates INS custody over an imprisoned alien.10 0 The custodial effects of other actions, including the commencement of
an investigation into whether a prisoner is subject to deportation and the issuance of an order to show cause at a deportation hearing, remain at issue.' 0 '
The conflicting definitions of detainers thus provide little
guidance for an analysis of the custodial effect of INS detainers. 10 2 Other cases, however, suggest that a detainer that contains or accompanies a "hold order" effects custody for habeas
corpus purposes. "'
II. THE DISPUTE AMONG U.S. COURTS OVER THE
CUSTODIAL EFFECT OF INS DETAINERS
Most aliens who have sought writs of habeas corpus to
challenge INS detainers refer to the general habeas corpus
statute. 0 4 In addition, many of the aliens seeking relief refer
to statutes that require the U.S. Attorney General to determine
100. See Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982). In Arias, the Seventh
Circuit considered whether a prisoner could use habeas corpus to test the legality of
his post-arrest detention after formal deportation proceedings had begun. Id. at
1141. The Arias court denied the petition. Id. at 1144. In Arias, an INS officer arrested the petitioner pursuant to a statute that empowers INS officers to arrest aliens
whom they believe are illegally in the United States and are likely to abscond before
the INS can obtain arrest warrants. Id. at 1141; see 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1988) (describing powers of immigration officers and immigration employees to act without warrant). The Arias court held that even if the prisoner's arrest and subsequent imprisonment in a local jail were illegal, the immediate scheduling of deportation proceedings rendered his detention "no longer so lawless as to allow a judge to free [the
prisoner] under the habeas corpus statute." Arias, 676 F.2d at 1143. The Seventh
Circuit had no occasion to decide whether the deportation proceedings gave the INS
custody over the prisoner, and the prisoner did not contest the issue in habeas
corpus. See id. at 1141-44.
101. See infra notes 111-56 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting court
decisions on custodial effect of INS detainers).
102. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting definitions of detainers).
103. See, e.g., Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1988). In Vargas, the Seventh Circuit relied on several cases that suggested that if a prisoner's custodial institution understood a detainer to require the hold of a prisoner, the institution filing
the detainer would have custody over the prisoner. Id. at 1031; see Rose v. Morris,
619 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1980); Orito v. Powers, 479 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1973).
104. See Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1030; Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593, 595 (8th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 (1989); Fernandez-Collado v. INS, 644 F. Supp.
741, 742 (D. Conn. 1986), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1461 (2d Cir. 1987); Orozco v. INS, 911
F.2d 539, 539 (11 th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988); supra
note 4 (quoting section 2241).
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an alien's status with "reasonable dispatch" and to begin deportation hearings "as expeditiously as possible."' 10 5 Courts
have held uniformly that aliens may not seek habeas corpus
relief under the statute that requires the INS to begin deportation hearings expeditiously because Congress, in passing the
statute, did not intend to afford the availability of such re06
lief. 1
105. See Prieto v. Gluch, 913 F.2d 1159, 1160-66 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 976 (1991); Orozco, 911 F.2d at 540; Guti v. INS, 908 F.2d 495, 496 (9th Cir.
1990); Campillo, 853 F.2d at 596.
The INS is a branch of the Department of Justice, whose highest official is the
Attorney General. Under section 1252 of title 8 of the U.S. Code, the INS must
schedule deportation hearings with reasonable dispatch. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1988).
Clause (a)(l) of section 1252 states that
[a]ny court of competent jurisdiction shall have authority to review or revise
any determination of the Attorney General concerning detention, release on
bond, or parole pending final decision of deportability upon a conclusive
showing in habeas corpus proceedings that the Attorney General is not proceeding with such reasonable dispatch as may be warranted by the particular
facts and circumstances in the case of any alien to determine deportability.
Id. § 1252(a)(1). Clause (i) of the same statute states that "[i]n the case of an alien
who is convicted of an offense which makes the alien subject to deportation, the Attorney General shall begin any deportation hearing as expeditiously as possible after
the date of conviction." Id. § 1252(i). Congress intended the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"), of which this section was a part, to "control illegal immigration to the [United States], make limited changes in the system for legal
immigration, and provide a controlled legalization program for certain undocumented aliens." H.R. REP.No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 45 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S. CODE. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i) (1988).
106. See Prieto, 913 F.2d at 1164-66; Orozco, 911 F.2d at 541; Gonzalez v. INS,
867 F.2d 1108, 1109-10 (8th Cir. 1989); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i) (1988); supra note
105 (quoting section 1252(i)).
The Supreme Court has developed a four-part test for determining whether a
private remedy is implicit in a federal statute. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
The Court said:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted" . . . ? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so
that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law?
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Courts have found that the text and legislative history of section 1252(i) suggest
that Congress did not intend to activate a private right of action in passing the statute, which requires the INS to begin deportation hearings expeditiously. See Prieto,
913 F.2d at 1165-66; Gonzalez, 867 F.2d at 1109-10; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i) (1988).
Courts have determined that Congress designed the statute primarily to expedite the
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Instead, courts seem to have concluded that potentially
deportable imprisoned aliens should bring suit under the "reasonable dispatch" test, in conjunction with the habeas corpus
statute, when custody in fact exists.' 0 7 Although the standard
INS detainer form refers to deportation and not exclusion, 8
processing of alieng, not to give criminal aliens a procedural or substantive right. See,
e.g., Prieto, 913 F.2d at 1165; see 132 CONG. REC. H9794 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. MacKay). "The language of the section imposed a duty on the Attorney
General rather than vesting a right in criminal aliens." Prieto, 913 F.2d at 1165. According to the Supreme Court, "there 'would be far less reason to infer a private
remedy in favor of individual persons' where Congress, rather than drafting the legislation 'with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class,' instead has framed the
statute simply as a general prohibition or a command to a federal agency." Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771-72 (1981). Congressman MacKay,
who proposed section 1252(i), argued that
[t]he policies require that deportation proceedings begin when a conviction takes place, the idea being that when the sentence is over, the person
would be deported.
Now, unfortunately, the very opposite is happening. These people are
not being deported; the expedited procedure is not working; [and] the local
and State jails are jammed up.
132 CONG. REC. H9794 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. MacKay). Another
congressman added, "We have had all kinds of excuses from the Immigration Service
for not deporting folks. This is the time for the excuses to stop." Id. at H9795 (statement of Rep. McCollum). The Senate also indicated an interest in slowing the inflow
of drugs, as well as relieving overcrowded prisons. 132 CONG. REc. S16,908 (daily
ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
Moreover, courts have determined that Congress, in passing section 1252(i),
demonstrated no intent to create a private remedy for criminal aliens. E.g. Prieto, 913
F.2d at 1166. See generally 132 CONG. REC. at H9794-95 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The
Supreme Court has said that "implying a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise at best." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979). Courts should avoid doing so when Congress's intent
to create such a right is "dubious" at best. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 82-84.
Furthermore, courts have determined that implying a private cause of action for
criminal aliens is inconsistent with the statute's legislative scheme. See, e.g., Prieto,
913 F.2d at 1166. The Prieto court found that although allowing criminal aliens to
bring suit could help reduce the drug influx into the United States and relieve overcrowded U.S. prisons, "it would seem anomalous" to grant such a right when Congress designs a statute not to benefit, but to remove aliens. Id. Finally, though the
deportation of aliens is a matter of federal law, courts have not found this factor
alone sufficient to suggest that Congress intended to afford aliens a private right of
action in section 1252(i). See id.; Gonzalez, 867 F.2d at 1109-10.
107. See, e.g., Orozco v. INS, 911 F.2d 539, 541 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam);
Gonzalez, 867 F.2d at 1110 (noting that petitioner's request could not be habeas
corpus request because it was not based on any habeas corpus statute); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1988) (requiring INS to begin deportation hearings "with reasonable dispatch"); supra note 105 (quoting section 1252(a)(1)); 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(1988); supra note 4 (quoting section 2241).
108. Standard INS Detainer, supra note 10.
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an alien facing possible exclusion may challenge a standard
INS detainer in habeas corpus."0 9 Regardless of which context
is at issue, courts have developed two lines of thought on the
custodial effect of an INS detainer."
A. The Vargas Approach: Custody May Be Present
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Vargas v. Swan,"' considered the potentially broad custodial effect
of INS detainers.1t 2 Mr. Vargas was serving a sentence for attempted first degree murder at the Waupun County Correctional Facility in Wisconsin. 1 3 The INS filed a detainer over
Mr. Vargas with the Waupun facility." 4 This detainer indicated that the INS had begun an investigation to determine
whether Mr. Vargas was subject to exclusion from the United
States." 5 Mr. Vargas argued that the detainer placed him in
109. See Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 1988); see infra notes
111-21 (discussing Vargas).
Among the cases in conflict, only Vargas and Pita v. INS considered the habeas
corpus rights of potentially excludable aliens. See Vargas, 854 F.2d 1028; Pita v. INS,
No. 88-2267, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10667 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 1988); cf.Gonzalez, 867
F.2d at 1108-09 (involving situation in which INS was investigating whether petitioner was potentially deportable or excludable, but petitioner sought only expeditious deportation proceeding). The courts in each case failed to reach the question
of whether section 1252(a)(1), which requires the INS to begin deportation hearings
with reasonable dispatch, mandates similarly timely commencement of exclusion
hearing. See Vargas, 854 F.2d 1028; Pita, No. 88-2267, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10667;
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1988); supra note 105 (quoting section 1252(a)(1)). In
the Vargas case, the INS contended that section 1252 concerned the treatment only of
deportable aliens. See Vargas Brief for Appellee, supra note 94, at 7. While the INS
argued initially that section 1252 did not apply to excludable aliens, it also analyzed
the section as though the section could apply to excludable aliens by analogy. Id. at
12 (recognizing possible applicability of section 1252(a) to excludable aliens) & 2934 (discussing applicability of section 1252(a) to potentially deportable aliens and
potentially excludable aliens in general as an alternative argument).
110. Compare infra notes 111-21 and accompanying text (discussing case suggesting that INS may obtain custody over alien by filing detainer with alien's prison)
with infra notes 122-56 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that INS
detainer has no custodial effect).
111. 854 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1988).
112. Id. at 1032-34.
113. Id. at 1029.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1032. The INS officer who filled out Mr. Vargas's detainer form
crossed out the word "deportation" and substituted "excludable." Id. at 1035; see
Supplemental Brief and Appendix of Appellant at app. 11, Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d
1028 (7th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1769) (reprinting detainer) [hereinafter Vargas Brief for
Appellant]. The detainer read: "Investigation has been initiated to determine
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INS custody, thus entitling him to an immediate exclusion
hearing or dismissal of the detainer.'1 6 The U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied Mr. Vargas's ap-

plication for a writ of habeas corpus.'

7

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for a determination of the detainer's
effect." 8 The Seventh Circuit noted that because a petitioner
can challenge future confinement in habeas corpus, the district
court should have inquired into whether the detainer placed a
"hold" on Vargas. t1 9 The court suggested that a failure to
"mark" the detainer form or to attach a warrant could make
the detainer ineffectual as a hold.' 2 0 Conversely, the court
suggested that the institutions filing and receiving the detainer
21
may, in practice, treat the detainer as a hold request.'
whether this person is subject to excludable [sic] from the U.S." See Vargas, 854 F.2d
at 1035; Vargas Brief for Appellant, supra, at app. 11. The Vargas court recognized
this detainer as modified. Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1028-34.
116. Vargas Brief for Appellant, supra note 115, at 10; see Vargas, 854 F.2d at
1029-30.
117. Vargas v. Swan, No. 86-C-1327 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 13, 1987).
118. Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1032-34 (7th Cir. 1988). The court could
not determine the impact of the detainer's "[aiccept this notice as a detainer" language. Id. at 1032-33.
119. Id. at 1031-34; see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973); Braden v.
30thJudicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 488-89 & n.4 (1973); Peyton v.
Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968). The Vargas court concluded that
[h]owever labelled, an action that has as part of its effect the "holding" of a
prisoner for a future custodian who has evidenced an intent to retake or to
decide the prisoner's future status at the end of his or her current confinement serves to establish custody for habeas purposes. Thus for Vargas to be
deemed in custody pursuant to the INS detainer, the effect of the detainer
here must be that Wisconsin places a hold on Vargas.
Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1032.
120. Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1033.
121. Id. An unsigned Wisconsin corrections department form suggested that
the department interpreted the detainer to be a hold order. Id. The unsigned form
stated that it "is to acknowledge that ... I [Mr. Vargas] was notified by [prison authorities] that HOLD ORDER (Detainer) HAS BEEN FILED AGAINST ME IN BEHALF OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE." Id. (emphasis in
original). Though perhaps not "tailored" to Mr. Vargas's particular detainer, the
form "suggests that Wisconsin may have understood that the detainer was a hold
order." Id.
An additional factor led the Vargas court to its holding. Similar to the prisoner in
Campillo v. Sullivan, Mr. Vargas had entered the United States with about 125,000
Cubans on the "Mariel Freedom Flotilla" in 1980. Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1029; see
Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593, 594 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082
(1989). To assure that Mariel Cubans awaiting immigration determinations were still
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B. The Majority Approach: Custody Is Absent
In Fernandez-Collado v. INS,12 2 the U.S. District Court for
the District of Connecticut first considered directly the custodial effect of an INS detainer that notified an alien's custodian
of either an investigation into the alien's deportability or the
alien's pending deportation hearing.1 2 3 Mr. Fernandez-Col1 24
lado was serving a prison sentence for cocaine distribution.
The INS served an "Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing" upon Mr. Fernandez-Collado and prison officials.1 25 This
order compelled the prisoner to show why his conviction
should not result in his deportation. 126 The order did not con1 27
tain a definite date for a hearing.
subject to exclusion, the INS placed the Mariel Cubans on "parole." Vargas, 854 F.2d
at 1029. This "parole ... maintain[ed] a fiction" that Mr. Vargas and others never
entered the country and were still excludable. Id. Uncertain as to the custodial effect
of this "parole," the Seventh Circuit remanded Mr. Vargas's case on this issue as
well. Id. at 1033-34. This issue, however, remains distinct from the issue surrounding the detainer. See id. at 1034 (discussing "jurisdictional issues").
In 1989, the INS issued a proposal to clarify the force and effect of its detainers.
See 54 Fed. Reg. 29,050 (1989) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a)(1)) (proposed
July 11, 1989). The proposed rule, if enacted, purports to "make clear" that an INS
detainer has no effect upon an alien or correctional institution until the institution
releases the alien from its custody. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,050 (1989). The proposal would
add the following passage to section 242.2(a)(1):
A Service detainer should not be construed by a correctional institution as a
demand that the alien's security level of confinement[, ... work release and
related matters be affected. Such matters are within the discretion of the
correctional institution in accordance with its own individual policies and
procedures and do not require the concurrence of the Service. A detainer
merely serves to notify the correctional institution that the Service wishes to
assume custody of the alien upon the alien's release from confinement. The
detainer will serve to place a "hold" on the alien only upon the alien's actual
release from confinement.
Id. The INS has not yet adopted the proposal. For a further discussion of this proposed rule, see infra note 170.
122. 644 F. Supp. 741 (D. Conn. 1986), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1461 (2d Cir. 1987).
123. Id. at 742-44. Prior cases evaluated the custodial effect of a detainer over
an alien that the INS filed after first issuing a deportation order against the alien. See
Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, 309 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1962); Slavik v. Miller, 89 F.
Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 184 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1950) (per curiam), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 955 (1951). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
124. Fernandez-Collado, 644 F. Supp. at 742.
125. Id.; see Order to Show Cause, supra note 11. Though this form is not the
standard INS detainer, the Fernandez-Colladocourt treated the form as a detainer. Fernandez-Collado, 644 F. Supp. at 743; see Standard INS Detainer, supra note 10.
126. Order to Show Cause, supra note 11.
127. See Fernandez-Collado v. INS, 644 F. Supp. 741, 742 (D. Conn. 1986),
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In response, Mr. Fernandez-Collado alleged that the detainer placed him in INS custody.1 28 He asked the district
court to command the INS to schedule him for an immediate
deportation hearing or to dissolve the detainer.129 Relying on
four unpublished orders within the same district, the court re30
jected Mr. Fernandez-Collado's claim, finding it premature.'
In Campillo v. Sullivan, 13 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
32
Eighth Circuit considered a similar habeas corpus claim.'
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida convicted Mr. Campillo of narcotics violations, and sentenced him
to fifteen years in prison. 3 3 The INS filed a standard INS detainer with Mr. Campillo's prison, notifying the prison of an
INS investigation into Mr. Campillo's deportability.1 34 The
prison transferred Mr. Campillo to a Minnesota federal prison,
and the detainer accompanied the transfer.' 35 Mr. Campillo
petitioned in habeas corpus for an immediate deportation
hearing or, alternatively, for the INS to expunge the de36
tainer. 1
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
aft'd, 857 F.2d 1461 (2d Cir. 1987). The order to show cause indicated that the hearing's "date, place and time [were] to be set." Id. The form has a provision allowing
an alien to request an immediate deportation hearing. See Order to Show Cause,
supra note 11.
128. Fernandez-Collado, 644 F. Supp. at 743.
129. Id. at 742-43.
130. Id. at 744 (citing Hechavarria-Castellano v. INS, Civ. H-84-498 (D. Conn.
Jan. 9, 1985); Martinez v. INS, Civ. B-81-515 (D. Conn. Nov. 30, 1981); Yuksel v.
INS, Civ. B-81-470 (D. Conn. Nov. 19, 1981); Lehder v. Smith, Civ. B-75-8 (D. Conn.
Feb. 10, 1975)).
131. 853 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 (1989).
132. Id. at 594. The Campillo opinion antedated the opinion in Vargas by eight
days. See Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1028 (7th Cir. 1988); Campillo, 853 F.2d at
593. Other circuit courts have found that the opinions in Campillo and Vargas are
irreconcilable. Prieto v. Gluch, 913 F.2d 1159, 1163 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 976 (1991); Guti v. INS, 908 F.2d 495, 496 (9th Cir. 1990). The Vargas opinion
makes no reference to the prior Campillo opinion. See Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1028-34.
133. Campillo, 853 F.2d at 594; see Brief for Appellant at 3, Campillo v. Sullivan,
853 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5335-MN) [hereinafter Campillo Brief for Appellant].
134. Campillo, 853 F.2d at 594.
135. Id. Neither party in Campillo v. Sullivan suggested that the transfer of Mr.
Campillo to a new prison invalidated the detainer. See Campillo Brief for Appellant,
supra note 133, at 4; Brief for Appellee, Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593 (8th Cir.
1988) (No. 87-5335-MN) [hereinafter Campillo Brief for Appellee].
136. Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593, 594 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1082 (1989).
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granted Mr. Campillo's request. 37 The Eighth Circuit, however, reversed, finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction.' 38 Using Fernandez-Collado as the primary authority for its
holding, the court found that the INS could not possibly obtain
custody over Mr. Campillo until the Minnesota prison released
Mr. Campillo.1 39 The Eighth Circuit digtinguished the prior
"technical custody" cases, noting that aliens in those cases
faced pre-existing deportation orders. 40
Furthermore, the Campillo court found a strong analogy
between the facts of Campillo and the facts of Moody v. Daggett.' 4 ' The Moody Court held that a federal parolee imprisoned for a crime committed while on parole does not deserve
an immediate parole revocation hearing when the U.S. government files a parole violator warrant with the parolee's
prison.m42 Moody concluded that because the inmate's present
confinement derived from the asserted parole violation, issuance of the warrant could not deprive him of any additional
liberty interest unless the issuing authority executed the14 3warrant and took custody of the inmate under the warrant.
Two years after Campillo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in Prieto v. Gluch,' 4 4 also concluded that the filing
of a detainer does not give the INS custody over an alien. 45 In
so finding, the Prieto court attempted to dismantle the Vargas
alternative by distinguishing three Supreme Court cases on
137. Id. at 594-95. The district court found that the INS failed to schedule a
deportation hearing as "expeditiously as possible" and to conduct such a proceeding
with "reasonable dispatch." Id.; see supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing
Attorney General's statutory duty to schedule and conduct deportation hearings).
138. Campillo, 853 F.2d at 594-95.
139. Id. at 595.
140. See id. at 596; see also Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, 309 F.2d 857, 865 (9th
Cir. 1962); Slavik v. Miller, 89 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 184 F.2d 575 (3d Cir.
1950) (per curiam), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 955 (1951). For a discussion of the "technical custody" cases, see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
141. 429 U.S. 78 (1976); see Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593, 595-96 (8th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 (1989). For Moody's definition of a detainer in the
context of a parole violator warrant, see supra note 93.
142. Moody, 429 U.S. at 86.
143. Id. at 86-87.
144. 913 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 976 (1991).
145. Id. at 1162. This opinion does not identify what kind of detainers the INS
filed over the multiple prisoners, but the detainers informed the prisoners' prison of
commencement of an investigation into the prisoners' deportability. Id. at 1163.
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46
which Vargas relied. 1
The Prieto court distinguished Peyton v. Rowe 14 7 and Preiser
v. Rodriguez 148 by concluding that the Prieto prisoners, unlike
the prisoners in Peyton and Preiser, were not subject to a "hold"
while they served their current sentences. 4 9 Peyton permitted
a prisoner's habeas corpus challenge to the second of two consecutive sentences, 5 ° while Preiser concluded that a prisoner
could challenge in habeas corpus a prison's deprivation of the
prisoner's good behavior credits.' 5 The Prieto court noted
that in each of those cases, unlike Prieto, a single institution
52
controlled the petitioner's present and future confinement.
The Prieto court also distinguished Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court of Kentucky.' 53 The Prieto court noted that Braden
resembled Prieto because in each case, one institution had present custody and another had future custody over the respective
prisoners. 54 Nevertheless, the Prieto court concluded that, unlike the Alabama prison warden in Braden, the prison warden in
Prieto could not be an INS "agent" pursuant to the INS detainer. 5 5 The Prieto court reasoned that the detainer failed to
claim a right of future custody and did not formally ask the
56
warden to hold the prisoner.
In summary, the split over the custodial effect of an INS

146. Id.; see Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1988).
147. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
148. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
149. Prieto v. Gluch, 913 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1990) (concluding that "INS
does not have future custody... in the sense that the prisons had future custody over
the petitioners in Preiser and Peyton"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 976 (1991).
150. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 67; see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing Peyton).
151. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489; see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing Preiser).

152. Prieto, 913 F.2d at 1164.
153. 410 U.S. 484 (1973); see supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing Braden). The Braden Court upheld a prisoner's habeas corpus challenge to a Kentucky indictment in a Kentucky court while the prisoner was in an Alabama prison.
Braden, 410 U.S. at 500.
154. Prieto v. Gluch, 913 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
976 (1991).
155. Id.
156. Id.; see Braden, 410 U.S. at 498-99 (describing how state holding prisoner
acts as agent for state lodging detainer against prisoner). Prieto, like Braden, fails to
define "agent." See Prieto, 913 F.2d at 1164. The arguments for and against applying
Braden's agency theory are syllogistic-agency exists when custody exists, custody
does or does not exist, therefore agency does or does not exist-and add nothing to
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detainer arises from courts' various interpretations of the text
of a detainer. 57 Most courts have found that a detainer, by its
terms, serves only as "notice" and effects no present INS custody over a prisoner. 158 Only one court found the words of a
detainer ambiguous, and5 the
court could not ascertain the de9
tainer's custodial effect.1

III. COURTS SHOULD EXAMINE INS DETAINERS TO
DETERMINE WHETHER THEY GIVE THE INS
PRESENT CUSTODY OVER IMPRISONED
ALIENS FOR HABEAS CORPUS
PURPOSES
Most courts have held that an INS detainer constitutes
only notice and therefore has no custodial effect. 16 ° The
weight of precedent and the absence of vital facts relevant to
such a determination, however, suggest that the majority of
courts have failed to scrutinize adequately the purpose of INS
detainers."'6
Courts and commentators have failed to define uniformly
the term "detainer."'' 62 Some courts and commentators believe that a detainer necessarily involves a hold,16 3 while others

do not.' 6" The Supreme Court takes an ambivalent view. 6 5
Nevertheless, most courts that have considered the custodial
a discussion of the custodial effect of an INS detainer. Cf. id. (advancing proposition
that agency cannot exist if custody is absent).
157. Compare supra notes 111-21 and accompanying text (discussing case suggesting that INS may obtain custody over alien by filing detainer with alien's prison)
with supra notes 122-56 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that INS
detainer has no custodial effect).
158. See supra notes 122-56 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding
that INS detainer has no present custodial effect).
159. Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1988).
160. E.g., Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1082 (1989).
161. See infra notes 168-205 and accompanying text (proposing means to ascertain custodial effect of INS detainers).
162. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of and
components of detainers).
163. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing detainer as hold order).
164. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (discussing detainer as no-

tice).
165. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985); supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing Carchman's view that detainer can be hold or notification).
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effect of an INS detainer have ignored this dispute. 1 66 These
courts have failed to recognize that the label "detainer" is not
67
self-defining.

1

A. A Proposalfor Reviewing INS Detainers
To discern properly a detainer's custodial effect, a court
must inquire into what effect the institutions that file and receive the detainer understand the detainer to have. 6 8 The
existence of the detainer form alone does not create possible

custody.169
A court must make two inquiries in order to determine the
custodial effect of an INS detainer. First, it must look at the
intent of the jurisdiction whose prospective confinement the
prisoner challenges. 70 The standard INS detainer's request
166. E.g., Prieto v. Gluch, 913 F.2d 1159, 1162-64 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 976 (1991); see supra note 15 (listing cases that find that INS detainer over
alien does not create INS custody over alien).
167. Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1028-33 (7th Cir. 1988); cf. Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 528-29 (1968) (noting that hanging on jail of sign reading "hospital" does not turn jail into hospital intended to rehabilitate alcoholics).
168. Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1033. Vargas noted that
[i]t
may very well be that some will understand the failure to mark on the
form or to include a warrant means that the "detainer" here is not fully
operative and is ineffectual to restrain Vargas. On the limited record before
us, however, it may be just as reasonable to believe that the practice of institutions receiving such notice, or at least the practice of Waupun [County
Correctional Facility, Mr. Vargas's prison], is to treat these forms . . . as
being requests to hold an inmate at the end of his sentence until the INS can
take him into custody.
Id.
169. Id. In Frazierv. Wilkinson, a federal prisoner challenged in habeas corpus a
consecutive state sentence although the state prison had lodged no detainer with the
federal prison. Frazier v. Wilkinson, 842 F.2d 42, 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
842 (1988). The court concluded that a prisoner may use habeas corpus in this circumstance "as long as there is a reasonable basis to apprehend that the jurisdiction
that obtained the consecutive sentence will seek its enforcement .... It would be
exceedingly technical to insist on the lodging of a detainer as evidence that a state
intends to require service of a consecutive sentence." Id. at 45.
170. Jones v.Johnston, 534 F.2d 353, 357 n.9 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Reed v. Byrd, 429 U.S. 995 (1976). The Jones court explained: "We believe
that where, as here, the future custodian has actually lodged a detainer against a
prisoner, thereby evidencing its intent to retake him at the end of his intervening
confinement, the state of custody is not ended by a later temporary withdrawal of the
detainer." Id. The court in Frazier understood this test to mean that the Jones v.
Johnston court relied on "the evident intent of the parole authorities to retake the
petitioner at the conclusion of his current sentence, [and thereby indicated] that the
test for 'custody' is the intention of the jurisdiction whose prospective confinement is
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that the reader "[a]ccept this form as a detainer" is ambiguous.' 7 ' Furthermore, the disclaimer that the reader treat the
detainer only as notice does not refer to the degree of control
to assert over the prisoner after the pristhat the INS plans
72
oner's release. 1
Second, a court must examine the practice of processing
detainers at the institution that receives the detainer. 73 An institution might interpret a detainer as a request to hold a prismight conclude that
oner. 17 4 Conversely, another institution
1 75
the detainer serves only as notice.
sought to be challenged, rather than the technical pendency of a detainer." Frazier,
842 F.2d at 45 n.2.
The INS's proposed addition to the Code of Federal Regulations purports to
explain that the INS cannot obtain custody over an alien in a correctional institution,
pursuant to a detainer, until the institution releases the alien from confinement. See
54 Fed. Reg. 29,050 (1989) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a)(1)) (proposed July
11, 1989); supra note 121 (quoting proposed rule). Even if the INS adopted this rule,
however, the actual effect of the filing of an INS detainer would remain unclear. Nowhere on the standard INS detainer, or on the order to show cause, does the INS
suggest that a detainer is not a hold and does not give the INS custody over an imprisoned alien. See Standard INS Detainer, supra note 10; Order to Show Cause, supra
note 11. Furthermore, a correctional institution holding an alien may believe that
the INS will retake the alien upon the conclusion of the alien's confinement, or may,
in practice, disregard a detainer's instructions. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text (discussing how institution may consider detainer to be restraint); infra
notes 174-79 and accompanying text (discussing how institutions have used filing of
detainers to justify imposing restrictions on inmates).
171. Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1032; see Standard INS Detainer, supra note 10; supra
note 94 (discussing this Note's assumption that INS identifies detainer as notice).
172. See Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1032. The order to show cause, like the standard
INS detainer, also describes itself as a "notice." Order to Show Cause, supra note 11;
see Standard INS Detainer, supra note 10. Two courts that have considered the custodial effect of an order to show cause over a potentially deportable alien found that
effect to be nonexistent. See Cabezas v. Scott, 717 F. Supp. 696, 697 (D. Ariz. 1989);
Fernandez-Collado v. INS, 644 F. Supp. 741, 744 (D. Conn. 1986), aff'd, 857 F.2d
1461 (2d Cir. 1987). This conclusion remains irreconcilable with the conclusions of
Vargas. Compare Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1032 with Cabezas, 717 F. Supp. at 697 and Fernandez-Collado, 644 F. Supp. at 744.
On April 16, 1991, the author of this Note conducted a search of the "Courts"
file in the "Genfed" library of LEXIS based on the case names and issues litigated.
The search revealed that no court has published an opinion that considered a potentially excludable alien's ability to attack in habeas corpus the INS's filing of an order
to show cause over the alien. Accordingly, this Note does not address that issue.
173. See Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1988).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1032; see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). In
Kennedy, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether Congress could divest a U.S.
citizen of his citizenship because the citizen departed the United States in time of war
to avoid military service. Id. at 146. The Court inquired into whether the congres-
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The histories of some INS detainer cases demonstrate that
some prisons do not follow the text of the standard INS detainer. 1 76 Prisons have used the filing of an INS detainer as1 7 a7
justification to increase a prisoner's security classification.
This practice disregards the INS's request that a prison accept
prisons
the detainer as notice only,1 78 and suggests that not all
179
interpret a detainer uniformly, or solely on its face.
sional act at issue was penal or regulatory in character. Id. at 168. The Court also
inquired into whether the sanction "has historically been regarded as a punishment."
Id.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also noted the importance of
an institution's practices. See United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071,
1076 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969). In Schuster, a prison transferred
the prisoner to a correctional mental institution. Id. at 1073. The prisoner challenged the transfer in habeas corpus. Id. at 1076. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit granted the petition, in part because the parole board, which retained
authority to parole inmates from the mental institution, did not in practice do so. Id.
at 1076 n.3.
176. See infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text (discussing prisons' disregard
of detainer's request that prison accept detainer as notice only).
177. See, e.g., Orozco v. INS, 911 F.2d 539, 540 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam);
Mohammed v. Sullivan, 866 F.2d 258, 259 (8th Cir. 1989); Roberts v. Matthews, No.
88-3014-0, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16494 (D. Kan. Nov. 30, 1990). In Mohammed, a
prison had initially classified a prisoner at the lowest security level. Mohammed, 866
F.2d at 259. After the INS filed a formal detainer with the prison, prison officials
reclassified him at a higher security level. Id. A change in a prison's security classification of a prisoner, resulting from the filing of an INS detainer over the prisoner,
does not create INS custody over the prisoner. Ganem v. INS, 825 F.2d 410, 1987
U.S. App. LEXIS 10499 at 2 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 1987); Roberts, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16494 at 3; see Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (holding that adverse
effects of detainer on prisoner's classification in prison do not activate due process
right to challenge detainer).
178. Standard INS Detainer, supra note 10. The detainer states: "This is for
notification purposes only and does not limit your discretion in any decision affecting
the offender's classification, work and quarters assignments or other treatment which
he would otherwise receive." Id.
179. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (discussing prisons' disregard for standard INS detainer's text). Prisons' abuse of detainers is not new. See
Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1973). The court in Cooper explained:
Punitive consequences of a detainer placed on the prisoner vary from one
institution to another. The generally recognized ones include the following
restrictions: the inmate is . . . (2) classified as a maximum or close custody
risk; (3) ineligible for initial assignments to less than maximum security prisons..; (5) not allowed to live in preferred living quarters such as dormitories; (6) ineligible for study-release programs or work-release programs; (7)
ineligible to be transferred to preferred medium or minimum custody institutions...; (8) not entitled to preferred prison jobs..; (10) caused anxiety
and thus hindered in the overall rehabilitation process since he cannot take
maximum advantage of his institutional opportunities.
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B. Most Courts Have Misapplied Precedents Involving Detainers
Most courts have not inquired properly into a detainer's
true purpose. Moreover, most courts that have considered an
INS detainer's custodial effect misapplied relevant case precedents in the detainer field.' 80 Moody v. Daggett, upon which
Campillo v. Sullivan relied, is not closely related to the cases in
dispute. 8 ' In Moody, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant
the petitioner a writ of habeas corpus to expunge the petitioner's parole violator warrant or to grant the petitioner a parole revocation hearing. 8 2 The Court denied habeas corpus
relief because the petitioner's current confinement derived
from his two homicide convictions, not the issuance of the warrant. 8 3 The Court also found that unless the U.S. Board of
Parole executed the warrant and took the petitioner into custody, a "far from certain" prospect, the petitioner could not
allege a loss of liberty interests.' 84
In INS detainer cases, however, the texts of the INS detainer forms give no hint of whether prisoners will face future
confinement under the detainers.85

Accordingly, a court

should seek more information to determine whether, in a given
case, the prisoner's prospect of future INS confinement is
strong, or less certain.' 86
Id. at 314 n.10 (citations omitted); see United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 737-40
(2d Cir. 1977), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978).
180. See infra notes 181-201 and accompanying text (proposing alternative analysis in cases involving INS detainers).
The "technical custody" cases fail to address accurately the circumstances currently in dispute. See Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1082 (1989); supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (discussing "technical custody" cases). In those cases, the INS had already completed its deportation
proceedings, and courts granted habeas corpus relief to ensure that existing deportation orders would be subject to judicial review. Campillo, 853 F.2d at 596. The petitioners in the INS detainer cases discussed in this note, however, sought to attack
future confinement that the INS might choose not to impose. See id. (noting that Mr.
Campillo faced no existing deportation order).
181. Campillo, 853 F.2d at 595-96 n.2; see Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976);
supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (discussing Moody).
182. Moody, 429 U.S. at 89.
183. Id. at 86-87.
184. See id. at 83-84, 87.
185. Standard INS Detainer, supra note 10; Order to Show Cause, supra note 11.
186. Cf. Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1988) (concluding that
INS failed to demonstrate what custodial effect detainer at issue actually had); see
supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing Moody's requirement that for pris-
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The Moody Court also concluded that when a federal institution or agency lodges detainers against prisoners in state
87
custody, the detainers are matters of comity or courtesy.
States, however, are not likely to ignore such detainers routinely.' 8 8 Given the Moody Court's view regarding future custody, 8 9 the prospect of future federal confinement in such circumstances is not so speculative that a court cannot assert jurisdiction over habeas corpus challenges to the detainers. 90
Moreover, two parties that issue and receive INS detainers
are, respectively, the INS and the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
two branches of the U.S. Department of Justice.' 9 ' The close
relationship between the parties should eliminate the speculative nature of a prisoner's future confinement under the INS
and should permit a court to inquire into that nature.' 9 2
Finally, the conclusions in Braden support the need for a
court to inquire into an INS detainer's true nature.' 9 3 In Braoner to challenge parole violator warrant, prisoner's likelihood of future incarceration under warrant must be greater than "far from certain").
Mr. Campillo alleged that a court could distinguish his case from Moody because
he was "almost certain, if not certain," to remain in custody after his existing sentence expired. Campillo Brief for Appellee, supra note 135, at 21. Mr. Campillo, however, offered no evidence to this effect. See id. at 20-23.
187. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 80-81 n.2 (1976). This comity suggests
that the institution receiving a detainer will give the detainer force out of respect for
and in deference to the issuing party. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed.
1990).
188. See Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1031 n.l.
189. Moody, 429 U.S. at 80-81 n.2. The Court found that a detainer "assure[s]
that an inmate subject to an unexpired term of confinement will not be released from
custody until the jurisdiction asserting a parole violation has had an opportunity to
act-in this case by taking the inmate into custody or by making a parole revocation
determination." Id.
190. Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1031 n.l (7th Cir. 1988).
191. Campillo Brief for Appellee, supra note 135, at 22.
192. Id. This argument does not apply in cases in which a state prison has present physical custody over an alien.
193. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); see
supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing Braden). The government in

Campillo v. Sullivan suggested that "it is questionable whether the developments affecting habeas jurisdiction in criminal law apply to issues arising in the context of
immigration law." Campillo Brief for Appellant, supra note 133, at 9. The government, however, concluded that "the instant case is controlled not by Braden," a criminal case, "but Moody," another criminal case. Id. at 17; see Campillo Brief for Appellee,
supra note 135, at 20.
Vargas v. Swan cited Braden, Preiserv. Rodriguez, and Peyton v. Rowe as authority for
its holding. Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1031 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973); Braden v. 30thJudicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Pey-
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den, a prisoner successfully challenged an out-of-state indictment in habeas corpus, compelling the state that filed the indictment either to secure the prisoner's presence in that state
for trial within sixty days, or to dismiss the indictment. 194 The
in Peyton v.
Braden Court recognized various considerations
95
relief.'
prompt
warranted
that
Rowe
The Braden decision expanded the reach of habeas corpus
by permitting prisoners to invoke the writ prior to trial. 196 Braden thus recognized the present impact of a custody that an
agency or institution may impose in the future.1 97 The decision, however, does not conflict with Moody. The Moody Court
concluded only that the petitioner did not deserve an immediate hearing, before the U.S. Board of Parole took him into custody as a parole violator. 198 The Court did not suggest that the
board must take physical custody of Mr. Moody, or begin a pa1 99
role revocation hearing, to obtain custody over Mr. Moody;
something less might have sufficed.
One distinction between the Braden detainer and the INS
detainers requires mention. In Braden, Kentucky clearly intended to act upon its indictment of Mr. Braden,2 °° and thus
filed a detainer. The intent behind an INS detainer, however,
ton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968)). The facts of Braden are more analogous to the facts
in INS detainer cases than are the facts of Peyton and Preiser. See Prieto v. Gluch, 913
F.2d 1159, 1163-64 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 976 (1991). In Peyton and
Preiser, the same custodian imposed the present and future confinements over the
respective prisoners. Id. In Braden and INS detainer cases, however, the respective
future custodians differ from the respective present custodians. Id. at 1164.
194. Braden, 410 U.S. at 485-86, 500.
195. Id. at 489 n.4. These considerations included court calendar congestion,
the "exigencies of appellate review," federalism, and common sense. Peyton, 391
U.S. at 63-64.
196. Braden, 410 U.S. at 508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
198. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 80, 86-89 (1976).
199. See id.at 80-89. Cf. Vargas Brief for Appellant, supra note 115, at 15 (contending that Moody Court did not "suggest that inmate was not in 'custody' by virtue
of the detainer" but, rather, "took jurisdiction of the case and resolved the issue on
the underlying merits"). The Supreme Court also considered the prospect of the
petitioner's future incarceration, which was "far from certain," in reaching its holding. Moody, 429 U.S. at 87. The Court offered no opinion on what degree of certainty of future incarceration under the parole violator warrant would have given the
Board of Parole present custody over the petitioner.
200. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 486
(1973) (petitioner "was returned to Kentucky to stand trial on the indictment").
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remains unclear. 21' Realistically, one may suspect that if the
INS files a detainer over an imprisoned alien, the INS will attempt to deport or to exclude the alien. 20 2 Mere suspicion,
however, should not guide a court. 2 3 A detainer has no comthus bears the remonly understood meaning.20 4 The INS
205
sponsibility of identifying that meaning.
CONCLUSION
An INS detainer is a general form, not tailored to the imprisonment of any particular alien or the procedures of any
particular institution. Its effect, on its face, is unclear. To ensure the rights of aliens to habeas corpus review, a court
should conduct a review of the INS's intent in issuing a detainer, and the INS's and recipient's' understanding of a detainer's effect. Only after completing this review may a court
properly divine the "holding" power of the detainer. When
the detainer effects a hold, INS custody over the alien is established. In that case, the alien deserves habeas corpus relief.
Jonathan E. Stempel *
201. Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1988).
202. See id. at 1030-31. The court concluded: "Realistically we doubt that the
INS will forego an attempt to exclude or deport Vargas, but in any event that is
beside the point." Id.
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of and
components of detainers).
205. Vargas, 854 F.2d at 1032.
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Fordham University.
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APPENDIX A
Immigration Detainer - Notice of Action
By Immigration and Naturalzation Serice

U.S. Deparme- nt of Jstice
Inruglation and Naturalization Service

File No.
Dnte

Nam of

t-ra
t

Month,D.,yandYearof Blirth Ito.

Nationaity

YOU ARE ADVISED THAT THEACTION NOTEDBELOWHAS BEENTAKEN BY TIS SERVICECONCERNING
THE ABOVE.NMhED NMATE OF YOUR INSTITUTION:

C

Investigation hasbeeninitiated to determinewhether this personis subject to deportation from the U.S.

C

An Orderto ShowCausein deportation proceedings,
a copy of which is attached,wa servedon

,19 ._
C A warrant
of arrestin deportation proceedings,
a copy of which is attached, wasasved on
,19..

C

Deportation from the United Stateshas beenordered.

ITIS REQUESTED
THAT YOU:
0

Accept thin notice asa detainer. Thisis for notification purposesonly anddoesnot limit yourdiscretion in any
decision affecting theoffender's clansification, work andquartersasagansents
or other treatment which he would
otherwise receive.

C

Please complete andsignthe bottom block of the duplicate of this form andreturn it to this office. 0
addressed
franked envelopeisenclosed
for your convenience.

C

Notify this office of thetime of release
at least30 daysprior to release orasmuch in advanceaspossible.

A self.

C3Notify this office in the eventof deathor transferto another institution.

Receipt acknowledged

Probable date of release:

F-'1-247 (R-v 3-143)N

.

em-na2,.v

Tole

twtz

0

9-0
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigrafdo. and Naturalization Service

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE and NOTICE OF HEARING
In Deportation Proceedings under Section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

File No.

In the Matter of

Respondent.

Address(number. uree. city.state.andZIP code)

UPON inquiry conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. it is alleged that:
I. You are not a citizen or national of the United States;
2. You are a native of
and a citizen of

3. You entered the United States at

on

or about
(date)

AND on the basis of the foregoing allegations, it is charged that you are subject to
deportation pursant to the following provision(s) of law:

WHEREFORE. YOU ARE ORDERED to appear for hearing before an Immigration Judge of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States Department of Justice at
on __at
m, and show cause why you should not
be deported from the United States on the charge(s) set forth above.
Dated:
(sigmture andtitle of issuing
officer)
(City andState)

Form 1-221 (Rev.7.1-73)Y

lowe)
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NOTICE TO RESPONDENT
ANY STATEMENT YOU MAKE MAY BE USED AGAINST YOU IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
THE COPY OF I lHlSORDER SERVED UPON YOU IS EVIDENCE OF YOUR ALIEN REGISTRATION
WHILE YOU ARE UNDER DEPORTATION 'RO(IEEDINGS. THE LAW RFOUIRES THAT IT BE
CARRIED WI TH YOU AT ALL TIMES
If you so choose, you may be represented in ihis proaceding, at no expense to the Government, by an
attorney or o:her individual authoried and qualified to represent person%before the Immigration and Nattiralization Service. You should bring with you an) affidavits or other documents which you desire io have
considered in connection with your case. If any document is in a foreign language, 'you should bring the
original and certified translation thereof. If you wish to have the testimony of any witnesses considered.
you should arrange to have such witnesses present at the hearing.
At your hearing you will begiven the opportunity to admit or deny any or all of the allegations in the Order
to Show Cause and that you are deportable on the charges set forth therein. You will have an opportuniy to
present evidence on your own behalf, to examine any evidence presented by the Government, to object, on
proper legal grounds, to the receipt of evidence arid to cross examine any witnesses presented by the Gov
ernment. Failure to attend the hearing al the tine and place designa:ed hereon may result in a determination being made by the Immigration Judge in your absence.
You will be advised by the Immigration Judge. before whom you appear, of any retief from deportation, in.
cluding the privilege of departing voluntarily. for which you may appear eligible. You will be given a tca,mnable opportunity to make any such application to the Immigration Judge.
Failure to attnd the hearing at the time and place designated hereon may result in your arrest and detention by the Imilgation and Naturalization Service.

REQUEST FOR PROMPT HEARING
To expedite determination of my case. I request an immediate hearing, and waive any right I may have to
mor extended notice.

(spparw. of1rapamima)

(f

u -- t

owfwtmamms
offarm

(date)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
T11 order and notic were served by toe an

-

-

-in the following manner:

(dat)

(hiamiwai "Anti* of

.1 ,

o~i

